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Abstract 
 
 
In the last two decades, there has been a global sea change in the theory and practice of 
central banking. The currently dominant “best practice” approach to central banking 
consists of the following: (1) central bank independence (2) a focus on inflation fighting 
(including adopting formal “inflation targeting”) and (3) the use of indirect methods of 
monetary policy (i.e., short-term interest rates as opposed to direct methods such as credit 
ceilings). This paper argues that this neo-liberal approach to central banking is highly 
idiosyncratic in that, as a package, it is dramatically different from the historically 
dominant theory and practice of central banking, not only in the developing world, but, 
notably, in the now developed countries themselves. Throughout the early and recent 
history of central banking in the U.S., England, Europe, and elsewhere, financing 
governments, managing exchange rates, and supporting economic sectors by using 
“direct methods” of intervention have been among the most important tasks of central 
banking and, indeed, in many cases, were among the reasons for their existence. The neo-
liberal central policy package, then, is drastically out of step with the history and 
dominant practice of central banking throughout most of its history. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 In the last two decades, there has been a global sea change in the theory and 
practice of central banking (Blinder, 1998; 2004). The “best practice” now commonly 
prescribed by the international financial institutions such as the IMF (IMF), as well as by 
many prominent economists, is best characterized as the “neo-liberal” approach to central 
banking (Epstein, 2003). The main components of this recipe are: (1) central bank 
independence (2) a focus on inflation fighting (including adopting formal “inflation 
targeting”) and (3) the use of indirect methods of monetary policy (i.e., short-term 
interest rates as opposed to direct methods such as credit ceilings). (Bernanke, et. al., 
19999) 
 
 These principles have far reaching implications. Central bank independence 
implies, first and foremost, that the central bank should not be subject to pressure from 
the government to finance government activities (deficits). The focus on inflation means 
that the central bank should not be concerned with other goals such as promoting full 
employment, supporting industrial policy or allocating credit to sectors of special social 
need, such as housing. Neither should the central bank attempt to manage exchange rates 
through monetary policy, and certainly not through using controls on capital flows.  The 
pursuit of indirect tools of monetary policy means that the central bank should not use 
credit allocation techniques such as subsidized interest rates, credit ceilings, and capital 
controls to affect either the quantity or the allocation of credit. These tenets are being 
promoted not only in developed countries, but also with great vigor in the developing 
world. 
 
 As I show below, this recipe –no support for the government expenditure, 
reluctance to manage exchange rates and opposition to use of capital controls, and a 
refusal to engage in credit allocation policies to support economic sectors -- is a highly 
idiosyncratic one in the sense that, as a package, it is dramatically different from the 
historically dominant theory and practice of central banking, not only in the developing 
world, but, notably, in the now developed countries themselves.1 Throughout the early 
and recent history of central banking in the U.S., England, Europe, and elsewhere, 
financing governments, managing exchange rates, and supporting economic sectors by 
using “direct methods” of intervention have been among the most important tasks of 
central banking and, indeed, in many cases, were among the reasons for their existence. 
The neo-liberal policy package currently proposed, then, is drastically out of step with the 
history and dominant practice of central banking throughout most of its history.2 
 
                                                 
1 See Chang, 2002, for parallel argument for a range of other policies and institutions. 
2 This is not to deny, of course, the important goal of price stability, and other stabilization objectives,  in 
the history of central banking. See more below. 
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 Indeed, historians of central banking will agree that financing governments and 
managing exchange rates were key of central banks for decades, if not centuries.3 But 
there will be more resistance to the idea that a common feature of central banking has 
also included the support of economic sectors. Following Gerschenkron’s seminal 
discussion (Gerschenkron, 1962), the standard story draws an important distinction 
between banking systems in late developers, such as France, and early developers, 
primarily England. Among the former, banks had to accumulate and allocate large 
amounts of long term credit so that local firms could catch up with those in England. Less 
discussed is an associated presumptive difference in the role of central banks in these two 
types of countries. When told, the story is that the Bank of England focused on 
macroeconomic issues such as maintaining the gold standard, controlling inflation, and 
acting as a lender of last resort to prevent financial instability, while central banks on the 
continent also were engaged in sectoral policies to support the medium term and long 
term financing of industry. The case of Japan is seen as more akin to the European 
countries, while that of the U.S. is seen as more like that of  England. 
 
 In this historiography, then, there were the macro-oriented central banks, such as 
the Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Reserve, that have used primarily indirect tools 
of policy and there are the credit allocating central banks, such as  the Bank of  France 
and the Bank of  Japan, that have supported industrial policy. This story goes on to 
suggest that achieving  modernism in central banking involves transforming  one’s 
central bank from the anachronistic European mode into the modern mode of the Bank of 
England or Federal Reserve by eschewing credit allocation and the use of “direct” 
controls to support economic sectors. (Fischer, 1994.) 
 
 The problem with this story is that it misses an important fact: virtually all central 
banks, including the Bank of England (BOE) and the U.S. Federal Reserve (the Fed) have 
used direct means to support economic sectors. And this has not simply been a matter of 
historical aberration, but rather, it has been an essential aspect of their structures and 
behavior for decades on end. In particular, a crucial role for both the BOE and the Fed 
has been to promote the financial sectors of their economies, and especially, to support 
the international role of their financial services industries. They have done this by using 
subsidized interest rates, legal restrictions, directed credit and moral suasion to promote 
particular markets and institutions. Moreover, at times, they have even oriented their 
overall monetary policy toward promoting the development of this particular economic 
sector.  
 
 The historical role of the Bank of England in promoting the City of London is 
well known, but the Federal Reserve’s similar role with respect to the U.S. financial 
markets and the international role of the dollar is less discussed. (Broz, 1997; Epstein, 
1981; Greider,1987). Still, when acknowledged, these cases have usually been viewed 
simply as a way of re-distributing income from one sector (industry and labor) to another 
(finance). But –and this is the important point here -- they should also be seen as 
mechanisms of “industrial policy” an attempt by the central bank to build up a “targeted” 
                                                 
3 There is a huge and rapidly growing literature on the history of the developments of central banks. For a 
succinct survey, see Goodhart, et. al, 1994; Sylla, et. al. 1999 stress the role of government. 
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sector of the economy, not only to deliver benefits to their friends and political allies, or 
to provide “macro stability”, but also because they are considered an important, dynamic 
sector for the economy as a whole. 
 
 The point, then, is this: virtually all central banks have engaged in “industrial 
policy” or “selective targeting”. The difference lies in which industries they have 
promoted.  Significantly, the whole tenor of economic development can be fundamentally 
affected by which of these industries the central bank and associated institutions 
promoted. Sorting this out is complex, however. Evidence suggests that central banks that 
are more oriented to industrial and social development are likely to have a more 
productive role as agents of development than those that build up the financial sectors, 
but presumably the impacts depend on many complex factors such as the structure of the 
domestic economies, their place in the global economy and the global economies place in 
the evolution of world history. 
 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I discuss 
the functions and rationales for central banking, as a way of introducing some concepts 
and distinctions that will be important in the rest of the paper. Section III discusses the 
evolution of major “OECD” central banks prior to the Second World War. I focus on 
their roles of financing governments, managing exchange rates, and promoting economic 
sectors. In section IV, I discuss the issue of sectoral policy in the Post World War II 
period. Section V extends the argument to central banking in developing countries. 
Section VI summarizes and concludes. 
  
  
II. The Role of Central Banks in Development 
 
 Most developed country central banks evolved from private banks, not in a bang, 
but over a long period of time. (Goodhart, 1998; Capie, et. al, 1994). Historians of central 
banking therefore debate the question: when did each “proto”  central bank become a 
“real” central bank? This debate naturally raises the question: what exactly is the 
definition of a central bank, and as a related matter, what functions must a bank perform 
to be properly called a central bank? This question is of historical interest because to 
understand the role of central banks in development, one must determine when central 
banks were actually functioning. Because of the slow evolution of “proto” central banks 
to actual ones, this is not an easy question to answer. 
 
 Most historians identify the following functions as being historically essential to 
the operations of central banks: (1) unifying  and issuing the country’s bank notes; (2) 
acting as the government’s bank; (3) acting as the commercial banks’ bank; (4) serving as 
a lender of last resort to the banking and even the financial system as a whole; (5) 
Conducting monetary policy to manage the foreign exchanges and the price level. Other 
activities have been added to this list: (6) conducting monetary policy to manage the 
overall level of economic activity and (7) allocating credit to promote national goals. This 
list is contentious with historians, with many claiming that one or the other of these is the 
sina qua non of central banking, and with most authorities ultimately throwing up their 
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hands and declaring that maybe they can’t agree on how to define a central bank, but they 
know one when they see it.4 (Capie, 1999) 
  
  There are at least three other roles of central banks that are less 
considered. One is the distributive role of central bank policy. Central banks’ policies can 
have differential impacts on different classes and groups: workers and capitalists, debtors 
and creditors, finance and industry, those operating in traded and non-traded goods. 
Linking this to the political economy of central banking, for example, bankers may 
oppose expansionary monetary policy because it might lower real interest rates and raise 
inflation, whereas workers and industrialists may prefer looser policy.  
 
 A second less-known role is the political role of central banks. These days, this 
role is primarily discussed in the context of whether or not the central bank is 
independent of the government (as opposed to be integrated into the government) with a 
focus, primarily, on the impact of central bank “independence” on inflation. But the 
political role of central banks is much more multi-faceted than this. During the period of 
de-colonization following the second world war, it was recognized that by promoting 
financial unification, central banks can play an important political role in helping to 
establish national sovereignty and unity. More recently, central banks which are 
relatively independent from government often represent and promote particular interests, 
constituencies and ideologies in the public and private spheres and thereby affect the 
color and tenor of overall political debate over economic policy (Epstein, 1982). In recent 
times, these  have often been aligned with those in financial circles, including external 
actors like the IMF, in promoting financial liberalization, inflation targeting and the 
elimination of capital controls. By contrast, central banks that are more integrated into 
government are more likely to promote policies and procedures that are framed more 
closely by government priorities and reigning ideologies.5 
 
 A third underappreciated role is the allocative role: central bank policy can 
deliberately or inadvertently affect the profitability and access to credit of different 
industries. This developmental role is currently under-emphasized, relatively to the other 
two. 
 In short, historically central banks have played many and diverse roles: Central 
banks have accumulated these roles in fits and starts, some first as private, government 
connected banks, some as “proper” public institutions. In any event, it is clear that the 
neo-liberal version of central banking has picked a highly truncated version of this list. 
 
Central Banks as Agents of Development 
                                                 
4 Capie, for example, claims that the lender of last resort function is the true sina qua non of central 
banking. (Capie, 1999). For purposes of this paper, we will try to avoid this problem by focusing on the 
roles played by banks that either were central banks or eventually evolved into them. 
 
 
5 Arguably, the neo-liberal approach to central banking that is now dominant could be said to be 
excessively focused on these two “lesser known” objectives: distributive (redistributing income to rentiers) 
and political (promoting the neo-liberal project). 
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 This brings us finally to the question: Where in all of this is the role of the central 
bank as an agent of development? The term ‘agent” implies that the central bank sees 
itself as trying to promote development. The current fashion is for central banks to take a 
narrow  view of this: the only roles it can play as an agent of development is to create a 
context of “macroeconomic stability”, including, financial stability through financial 
regulations. In our histories, however, we will see that for much of central banking 
history, many central banks have aspired to do much more than that, with a number of 
them even seeing themselves as “agents of development” in the self-aware meaning of 
the term. 
 
III. The Development of Central Banking in the U.S., U.K., Europe and Japan 
 
Financing the State 
 
 Historians of the development of financial institutions in general and central 
banks in particular increasingly emphasize  the role of  the state as being critical in the 
development of banking and central banking. Among the most important aspects is the 
impact of the state’s need for finance. According to three of the most prominent 
historians of banking: 
 
“The more one studies the historical origins and development of modern financial 
systems, the more it becomes apparent that at most of the critical points when financial 
systems changed, sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse, the role of the state 
was of paramount importance…Long before private economic entities…came to require 
financing on a scale beyond the capabilities of individual proprietors and partners, 
governments had needs for large scale finance….Among the needs for which states 
needed financing were: solidifying and extending their authority, unifying the disparate 
components of their states under a central administration, promoting state-led and state-
financed economic development projects as means of increasing state power, and, 
perhaps most important of all, waging wars against other competing states.” (Sylla, et. al., 
1999, p. 1). 
 
 Among the ways states found to raise funds for these purposes, the most 
important included making arrangements with or creating special banks, typically by 
issuing a bank charter. In exchange for giving these banks monopoly over note issue and 
other privileges, the bank would promise to finance the state. Among other means, the 
bank would then generally take the debt issue of the government and distribute it among 
a decentralized group of lenders. This would facilitate the government’s borrowing, and 
would also allow the lenders to create a “lender’s cartel” thereby improving their 
enforcement of debt repayment by the government. (North and Weingast, 1989). It is 
these banks that often evolved into central banks. 
 
 The initial creation of the Bank of England in 1694, in the midst of a major war 
with France, is, perhaps, the classic example of this role of central banking. In effect, a 
deal was struck:  the state would get badly needed loans at a preferential rate in exchange 
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for granting extensive legal privileges to a private banking corporation, a corporation that 
eventually became the Bank of England. (Broz, p. 215).6 The role of the Bank of England 
in financing the crown is commonly cited as an important factor in the war-making 
prowess of Britain and, particularly, in its success in the Napoleonic Wars.  
 
 While the Bank of England is the best-known case of the fiscal role in central 
bank development, there are many other prominent examples: the first two banks of the 
United States in the 19th century, the Bank of France (1800) the National Bank of 
Belgium (1850), the Bank of Spain (1874) and the Reichsbank (1876). (Capie, et. al., 
1994, pp. 1 -231; Broz, 1997, ch. 6).  
 
 Central banks, then, at their inception, were designed to finance the state. How 
ironic it is, then, that the current fashion in central banking is to severely limit the ability 
of central banks to carry out this function, especially when state capacity in developing 
countries have been eviscerated by years of structural adjustment. 
 
Managing Exchange Rates and the Price Level 
 
 Since most of the European countries were on a specie standard in the 19th 
century, a crucial task of these central banks was to maintain the convertibility of the 
county’s currency into specie at the fixed price. In practice, this meant managing the 
country’s money, credit and gold reserves so as to maintain convertibility. (Eichengreen, 
1992).  Maintaining convertibility at the fixed  rate also served to limit increases in price 
levels and, therefore, the task of these central banks was to target the exchange rate and, 
in doing so, also implicitly manage the price level. 
 
 Yet, in practice, most central banks had additional goals. These included directing 
credit to specific uses, and limiting economic instabilities associated with inflows and 
outflows of capital and gold. Some central banks also tried to maintain trade surpluses, 
rather than automatically adjust according to gold standard rules of the game that were 
supposed to automatically lead to international trade balance. 
 
 To pursue these additional objectives, central banks employed numerous “gold 
devices”. (Eichengreen, 1992; Yeager, 1976). These were employed, among other 
reasons, to give the central bank some freedom to manage monetary and credit conditions 
as seemed appropriate for domestic business (Yeager, 1976, p. 307, fn. 25) and other 
domestic goals. In Germany, for example, interest free loans were given to importers of 
gold, and exports of gold were impeded. (Yeager, 1976, p. 306). This, of course, amounts 
to a type of exchange controls. Similar devices were used in France where, for example 
the central bank sometimes insisted on its legal right to redeem its notes in silver 5-franc 
pieces rather than gold, a clear tax on the export of gold (ibid.). These devices “put some 
slight variability into the gold values of monetary units and slightly increased the range of 
possible exchange rate fluctuations”(ibid.).  These and related devices clearly undermine 
the notion of a rules based and automatic system of central bank policy, as well as one 
                                                 
6 Broz notes that “as a concomitant, the plan included a set of mechanisms to limit the government’s ability 
to renege on its loan agreements”. (Broz, p. 215). 
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single-mindedly devoted to price stability. The Bank of England, of course, had the most 
power to utilize discretion (see below), but other central banks did so to some extent as 
well. Still, to be sure, these were modest efforts to generate flexibility within the context 
of the relative straight jacket of the gold standard. 
 
 In short, even within the confines of the international gold standard, central banks 
used exchange and capital controls to buy some freedom of maneuver to pursue domestic 
objectives. This violates the neo-liberal recipe of today, but was used to good effect in the 
(old) liberal period of the 19th century. 
 
Sectoral Policies 
 
 As discussed earlier, central banks, both on the European continent and off, 
promoted sectoral goals.  
 
Continental European Central Banks in the 19th Century 
 
 Central banks in Europe were not only important lenders to the state. Many of 
them were also very involved in lending to industry. (Capie, et. al., 1999,  p. 69; Cameron 
and Neal, 2003). For example, the Bank of France, the Bank of the Netherlands, and the 
Bank of Italy all had widespread branch networks, and had very close relationships with 
industry. The Reichsbank of Germany also had important industrial customers. (ibid.) 
 
 It is important to remember in this discussion that these “central” banks were 
private banks with special government privileges. Hence, they were profit oriented.7 But 
the fact that these were private institutions should not lead us to underestimate the 
“public” role they played in helping to direct credit. Because these banks had special 
monopoly privileges from the government, including a monopoly on note issue and, in 
some cases, the requirement that the government and even other banks place reserves 
with them, these banks had subsidized access to credit. The fact that they, then, loaned 
this subsidized credit to industry, likely played an important role in the development of 
industry in these economies (Cameron and Neal, 2003). Knodell reports that countries 
that had central banks during this period had, on average, lower nominal and real interest 
rates, than countries that did not (Knodell, 2004).8 This resulted presumably from both 
the efficiencies of these institutions and also the subsidies created by the state in their 
formation and operations. 
 
 The point is that there was a government/central bank financial structure that was 
able to mobilize credit, both for state activities as we saw earlier, but also for industry. 
And, in many cases, this was accomplished while countries remained on the gold 
standard, perhaps with the help of “gold devices” that served to some extent as exchange 
                                                 
7 This has been identified as a key problem in their functioning as “real” central banks (ibid; Goodhart, 
1988) 
8 Paradoxically, she also reports that this did NOT lead these countries to experience more rapid economic 
growth. Knodell argues that this may have been due to he commitment of these central banks to staying on 
the Gold Standard (Knodell, 2004).  
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controls to give central banks some freedom to pursue domestic goals. And this was all 
happening during the so-called “laissez-faire” period of European capitalism in the 19th 
century. 
 
 One should not over estimate the extent to which these central banks were 
“agents” of development in the sense of having a developmental “vision” and intent. 
These central banks were private, not public. As a result, their interest was in making a 
profit. At times, this concern even conflicted with their activities as central banks. Still, 
however imperfectly, these central banks helped mobilize and allocate finance to industry 
and to government in the service of economic development, sometimes directed by a 
developmental vision from the state. 
 
Britain and The U.S. 
 
 As discussed earlier, the Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Reserve are often 
seen has lacking in “sectoral” policy during their early years. While these central banks 
were not as closely connected with “industry” as central banks on the continent, their 
association was not completely lacking. But the main problem with this argument is that 
these banks were very much involved in promoting sections of the financial sector in 
their economies. We first discuss the Federal Reserve and then take on the more familiar 
story of the Bank of England. 
 
The Federal Reserve9 
 
 The common explanation of the founding of the Federal Reserve in 1913 was that 
it was designed to enhance the country’s lender of last resort function to prevent the 
cyclical drains of reserves from regional banks and resulting financial panics that had 
characterized earlier decades. While this is certainly part of the story, another key factor 
was the desire on the part of New York bankers to enhance their ability to compete with 
London banks in the global financial market. As Carter Glass, who was instrumental in 
the creation of the system, told a Washington audience during the first world war: 
 
“The proponents of the Federal Reserve Act had no idea of impairing the rightful prestige 
of New York as the financial metropolis of this hemisphere. They rather expected to 
confirm its distinction, and even hoped to assist powerfully in wresting the scepter from 
London, and eventually making New York the financial center of the world.. (quoted in 
Kolko, 1963, p. 254).” 
 
 As Broz describes in great detail, relative to the prior National Monetary System 
the key changes in the Federal Reserve Act concerned creating markets in bankers and 
trade acceptances that would allow New York Banks to compete with British banks in the 
highly lucrative financing of international trade. (Broz, 1997, ch. 1).  A key factor was 
creating a central bank that would allow the bank to discount these acceptances. As Paul 
                                                 
9 This section draws heavily on the fascinating book by Broz, 1997, as well as the more familiar work of  
Greider (1987). See also Epstein (1981; 1982). Limited space prevents me from discussing many other 
issues here, including the role of wildcat banking, and the J.P. Morgan banks’ central banking roles. 
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Warburg, a New York banker and one of the master-minds behind the Federal Reserve 
Act put it: American discounting practices prior to the founding of the Fed was “as 
backward as Europe at the time of the Medicis, and Asia, in all likelihood, at the time of 
Hammurabi”. (quoted in Broz, 1997, p. 40.)10 
 
 In determining the choice of eligible paper for open market operations, the 
authors of the Federal Reserve Act chose instruments that would help develop these 
markets in order to improve the competitiveness of U.S. banks with their London 
counterparts. These included bills of exchange, or trade acceptances drawn within the 
United States, which was not used extensively to finance domestic transactions. (Broz, p. 
48). 
 
 Key components of the Federal Reserve Act were also designed to enhance the 
ability of the U.S. financial system to manage the gold standard. Since the resumption of 
the gold standard in 1879, the U.S. had perhaps the freest market for gold in the world, 
and did not have a central bank to protect the supply in case of crisis. (Broz, p. 49). In 
addition, the US did not have a central bank that could employ gold devices to help create 
policy space to pursue other goals.  
 
 Promoting New York banks in their quest to become more competitive with 
British Banks in global business was also associated with promoting the U.S. dollar as an 
international currency. Despite the fact that the U.S. had accumulated massive amounts 
of foreign assets and had been turning into the world’s largest creditor, the U.S. dollar 
was still not widely used in international finance. The Federal Reserve Act was also 
intended to rectify that situation. This too was seen by New York bankers as enhancing 
their profits (Broz, ch. 2). To some extent, this promotion of the international aspects of 
the Federal Reserve Act in order to help New York bankers compete with London was 
simply a matter of “rent seeking”: the bankers were well organized and they had the 
economic and political muscle to push through the Act in Congress, despite opposition 
from other sectors. Still this act of targeted policy to subsidize and promote a particular 
financial sector in its quest to become more internationally competitive came at a time of 
major increase in the U.S. economic and political role in the world economy, and further 
developed that role. 
 
 One could discuss many other examples of ways in which the Fed has supported 
the financial sector of the US –from LDC debt crisis bailouts, to promoting IMF 
structural adjustment policies, to underwriting the stock market during the “tech bubble” 
- but space does not allow. Still, it seems clear that, from its inception, the Fed has 
engaged in significant amounts of sectoral promotion. To claim otherwise is to ignore 
history.  
 
The Bank of England 
 
 The case of the Bank of England and its connection to the City of London is well 
known. London had been the financial center of the world, or had a monopoly of capital 
                                                 
10 The issues here are quite technical, but see Broz, 1997, ch.1 for a clear exposition. 
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exports at least up to 1850. Rivalry with the French heated up around mid-century, but 
the Franco-Prussian War destroyed French chances. By 1875 London was supreme in 
both domestic and international money markets. (Kindleberger, 1993, p. 261).By the late 
19th century, during the heyday of the classical gold standard, British banks and bond 
houses were dominant in international capital markets and in the financing of trade.  For 
example, during the boom in foreign securities from 1904 to 1913, British bond and 
banking houses sent abroad close to half of British savings and 5 percent of national 
income (Kindleberger, 1996, p. 136.) 
 
 A major reason for British financial primacy was the structure and stability of the 
international gold standard, which, at times, the gold standard operated more like a 
sterling standard (Kindleberger, 1996, p. 136). A French study quoted by Kindleberger 
comparing the relative competitiveness of finance in London versus Paris highlights the 
role of the gold standard in conferring advantages on London:  “Paris was especially 
handicapped by the practice of bimetallism, which gave the Bank of France the choice of 
whether it would pay off its notes in gold or silver – whereas in London one could get all 
the gold one wanted without hesitation on the part of the authorities or any doubt” 
(quoted in Kindleberger, 1993, p. 262.) Summing up, Kindleberger notes that London 
was a world financial center, while Paris was a European one. (ibid., p. 263). 
 
 For our purposes, the relevant lesson is this: while other factors were important, 
such as the efficiency and sophistication of the British financial institutions, the existence 
and stability of the gold standard, with sterling at its center (along with gold) was 
enormously important in the success and global competitiveness of the British financial 
system. Hence, the efforts and support that the Bank of England made to develop and 
maintain the gold standard were, in effect, a major subsidy and support of the city of 
London financial institutions themselves.  For England then, central bank policy to 
maintain the convertibility of sterling into gold was not only a macroeconomic policy; it 
was, very importantly, also a sectoral  policy, a sectoral policy designed to support the 
international competitiveness of British financial institutions.11  
 
 Thus, even during the classical liberal period of the late 19th and early 20th 
century, all the central banks considered here have engaged in sectoral policies, including 
the Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Reserve. After the Great Depression and the 
Second World War, this use of selective policies became even more integral to central 
bank policies, and more widespread. 
 
IV. Western Central Bank Policies after the Second World War: Credit Allocation 
for Social Goals 
 
 It is well known that following the disasters of the Great Depression and the 
second World War, governments in the UK, Europe, Japan and even the US asserted 
much greater control over central banks and the banking industries. (Capie, et. al., 1999). 
Central banks became, once again, important institutions for financing and managing 
                                                 
11 There were many other ways in which the Bank of England supported the domestic financial sector. But 
for reasons of space, I focus here on the gold standard. 
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government debts accumulated during the war; and after the war, central banks also 
became important tools for rebuilding and restructuring national economies and 
providing for social needs, often under government’s direction. Central banks utilized a 
variety of credit allocation techniques to accomplish these goals, and in most cases, these 
techniques were supported by capital and exchange controls on international capital 
movements. (see, for example, Epstein and Schor, 1992). 
 
 The types of controls central banks used, the goals they were directed to and their 
degree of success varied from country to country and time to time. No matter how 
successful, virtually all of these central banks had ended or severely limited their use of 
these controls by the mid 1980’s.  Under the neo-liberal play book, these controls, despite 
their long histories and many successes, were thrown in the dust bin of history. 
 
Developed Country Central Banks as Agents of Development during the “Golden Age of 
Capitalism”12 
 
 The great depression of the 1930’s and then the Second World War was a 
watershed for central banks in the industrialized world. Virtually all were brought under 
more government control and were reoriented to facilitate government priorities. In the 
United States, the Federal Reserve was brought under tighter government control in the 
late 1930’s and then, at the start of World War II was required to help the Treasury 
finance the war effort at relatively low interest rates.13 It remained under Treasury control 
until 1951, but even after that, was subject to significant government pressures to support 
the market for U.S. government debt that had been accumulated during the war. In 
addition, the Humphrey-Hawkins full employment bill obligated the Federal Reserve to 
pursue polices to support high employment while controlling inflation. The era of 
Keynesian policies was at hand. (Epstein and Schor, 1990).  
 
 The U.S. government had a myriad of financial institutions, moreover, that 
supported national goals, notably housing. (Dymski, 1993; Wolfson, 1993). The Savings 
and Loan banks, along with other government supported financial institutions, for 
example,  supported housing. During this period, the Federal Reserve policy was quite 
sensitive to the needs of the housing market concerns and even tailored its monetary 
policy to avoid significantly harming it. (Maisel, 1973). 
 
 In Europe and England, central banks that had been independent before the War  
found themselves subject to state control after 1945 (Capie, et. al., 1999, p 72). During 
the War, monetary policy was often implemented through direct controls while interest 
rates were held low and constant. Direct controls continued in the aftermath of the war 
with various credit allocation techniques. (Capie, et. al., 1999, p. 25.)  
 
Credit Allocation Techniques 
                                                 
12 I have drawn the material for this section mainly from  U.S. House of Representatives, (1972), Zysman 
(1987), Hodgman (1972), and U.S. Senate (1981). See also Pollin, 1995 and Grabel, 2000. 
13 Though Paul Samuelson, among others remarked that the long term interest rate should have been set 
even lower (see Epstein and Schor, 1995). 
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 Credit controls are commonly defined as measures by which the authorities seek 
to modify the pattern and incidence of cost and availability of credit from what markets 
would generate on their own (Hodgman, 1972, p. 137). Credit controls seek to influence 
credit allocation and interest rate structures. (ibid.). In Europe credit controls have served 
a number of purposes: (1) to finance government debt at lower interest rates (2) to reduce 
the flow of credit to the private sector without raising domestic interest rates (3) to 
influence the allocation of real resources to priority uses and (4) to block channels of 
financial intermediation and thus to assist restrictive general monetary policy and (5) to 
strengthen popular acceptance of wage-price controls by holding down interest income. 
(Hodgman, ibid.). 
 
 European experiences with credit controls varied from country to country. In 
Germany, controls were used only briefly after the Second World War. In the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, extensive use was made of them, but they were 
always seen as temporary and short-run expedients. In the Netherlands, credit controls 
were used to support macroeconomic policy, rather than credit allocation. In the United 
Kingdom, the principle aim of controls was to facilitate low cost government debt. The 
government was concerned about the impacts of high interest rates on the bond market, 
on income distribution and on the balance of payments. A more limited aim of the 
quantitative ceilings was to guarantee a flow of short term credit at favorable interest 
rates to high priority activities such as ship building and the finance of exports and 
productive investment in manufacturing. Credit ceilings were put into place, and 
exemptions were sometimes made for priority sectors (Hodgman, 1972, p. 144). 
Moreover, the Bank of England identified sectors for which credit should be limited, such 
as consumption and the financing of imports. In England, as elsewhere, these credit 
controls were accompanied by exchange and capital controls.  
 
 In France, Italy and Belgium were a different story. There, the principle of 
controlling credit flows and interest rates to serve national interests was widely accepted. 
France had, perhaps, among the most extensive and successful sets of controls, that were 
part of the government’s overall approach to industrial policy. The Bank of France was 
nationalized in 1945, and placed under the National Credit Council, the institution in 
charge of implementing the financial aspects of the government plan. (Hodgman, p. 147; 
Zysman, 1987). The broad aim of credit policy in France was to contribute to the 
modernization of the French economy and its ability to compete in international markets. 
To influence the volume and allocation of credit, the Bank of France used various 
methods (see Hodgman, 1972, p. 148 and Zysman, 1987, for descriptions).  
 
 Variable “asset based reserve requirements” were widely used. These require 
banks have to observe minimum reserve requirements based on the assets they hold, but 
the central bank varies these to promote lending to desired sectors. They do this by 
allowing lower required reserve rates on privileged assets. A second technique – ceilings 
on credit extension – have been used as well. The ceilings were used to reduce credit 
expansion without raising interest rates, and also to allocate credit: priority sectors were 
exempted from the ceilings.  These included short-term export credits, medium-term 
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loans for construction, and others. These ceilings applied to a large range of financial 
institutions, and were accompanied, as well, by capital and exchange controls as an 
important concomitant. (Hodgman, 1972. pp. 148-149;  Zysman, 1987). A third tool was 
the scrutiny of individual credits made by banks. This allowed the Bank of France, for 
example, to approve loans for privileged purposes. Another approach to affecting the 
allocation of credit involved the use of rediscounting of bills at lower interest rates for 
priority purposes (ibid., p. 151).14 
  
 Zysman (1987) has emphasized the role of these credit allocation techniques in 
helping to revive the French economy and help it adjust to structural challenges in the 
post war period. Italy and Belgium also used similar policies. In the case of Italy, a major 
goal was to help develop the Southern part of the country. (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 1972, p. 11).  
 
 Oddly enough, there has not been a comprehensive statistical analysis of the 
effectiveness of these controls over a range of industrial countries. The studies that have 
been done report that the controls were effective (ibid; p. 145). More broadly, the general 
consensus of analyses of these experiences is that they are most successful when the 
controls apply to a broad swath of the financial sector, to avoid arbitrage and avoidance, 
when they are accompanied by capital and exchange controls, to avoid capital flight, and 
when they are part of a coherent plan of economic promotion and development (Zysman, 
1987; Hodgman, 1972; U.S. Senate, 1972; U.S. House of Representatives, 1981). These 
same lessons apply to developing countries as well, though they were not always applied. 
 
The Neo-liberal Order 
 
 To be sure, not all of these efforts were successful. Yet most accounts suggest that 
some, if not many of them were in reaching important social goals including rebuilding 
industry, supporting housing and financing the overhang of government debt acquired 
during the war while avoiding massive shifts in wealth toward rentiers. Still, by the 
1990’s many if not most of these programs had been swept away. The increase in 
inflation, elimination of exchange and capital controls, and the break down of the Bretton 
Woods system all contributed to the dramatic changes in financial markets and policies. 
Still, rather than seeing this evolution to liberalized financial markets and central banking 
policy as a conjunctural change, economists and policy makers have identified the current 
                                                 
14 Analysis by Lester Thurow and the U.S. House Banking Committee in the early 1970’s 
identified three main techniques for protecting or promoting priority sectors: (1) asset 
based reserve requirements14 (2) government borrowing in the capital market and re-
lending to preferred sectors and (3) competition by government financial institutions for 
primary saving flows and lending captured flows to preferred sectors (for example, 
through the government postal savings system). In the case of Sweden, asset based 
reserve requirements were used to aid the housing market. (ibid.)  In Japan, government 
savings institutions were used to capture personal savings flows and these were 
channeled by the finance ministry (of which the Bank of Japan is a part) to industries that 
were perceived to most preserve economic growth. (ibid., p. 13). 
 
 16
confluence of policies and structures as somehow “modern”,  even optimal, and therefore 
worthy of emulation throughout the globe. 
 
V. Central Banks as Agents of Development in Developing Countries 
 
Introduction 
 
 After the Second World War, there was a major transformation of central banking 
in the developing world. In many respects, these changes paralleled those in the 
developed world just described. But in developing countries, central banks were much 
more emphatically agents of economic development then in many richer countries. As 
described by renowned monetary historian of the New York Federal Reserve, Arthur I. 
Bloomfield reported in 1957: 
 
“During the past decade there has been a marked proliferation and development of central 
banking facilities in the underdeveloped countries of the world, along with an increasing 
resort to the use of monetary policy as an instrument of economic control. Since 1945, 
central banks have been newly established and pre-existing ones thoroughly reorganized, 
in no less than some twenty-five underdeveloped countries. In other cases the powers of 
pre-existing central banks have been broadened ..in large part the recent growth of central 
banking in the economically backward areas has also reflected a desire on the part of the 
governments concerned to be able to pursue a monetary policy designed to promote more 
rapid economic development and to mitigate undue swings in national money incomes.” 
(Bloomfield, 1957, p. 190.) 
 
Bloomfield goes on to describe the functions, powers, and goals of these central banks. 
 
“Many of the central banks, especially those established since 1945 with the help of 
Federal Reserve advisers (emphasis added) are characterized by unusually wide and 
flexible powers. A large number of instruments of general and selective credit control, 
some of a novel character, are provided for. Powers are given to the central bank to 
engage in a wide range of credit operations with commercial banks and in some cases 
with other financial institutions…..These and other powers were specifically provided in 
the hope of enabling the central banks…to pursue a more purposive (emphasis added) 
and effective monetary possible tan had been possible for most….that had been set up 
…during the twenties and thirties…(that) for the most part (had) been equipped with 
exceeding orthodox statutes and limited powers which permitted little scope for a 
monetary policy designed to promote economic development and internal stability 
(emphasis added)…” (ibid., p. 191). 
 
 Somewhat surprisingly from the perspective of today’s financial orthodoxy, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York helped to establish developing country central banks 
and encouraged them to have a broad range of monetary and credit powers, especially in 
contrast to the orthodoxy of the 1920’s and ‘30’s. Of course, the Federal Reserve 
continued to be concerned about the importance of stabilization, controlling excessive 
credit creation and maintaining moderate inflation. 
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“But (the central bank’s) efforts need not, and in fact should not, stop here. The majority 
of central banks in underdeveloped countries have in actual practice adopted a variety of 
measures designed more effectively to promote the over-all development of their 
economies. Some of these measures are admittedly outside the traditional scope of central 
banking, but central banking in these countries should not necessarily be evaluated in 
terms of the standards and criteria  applied in the more developed ones….the central bank 
can seek to influence the flow of bank credit and indeed of savings in directions more in 
keeping with development ends.” (ibid., p. 197).  
 
 Bloomfield describes the same tools of credit manipulation described earlier with 
respect to Europe, Japan and even the United States: “..selective credit controls applied to 
the banking system, through help in establishing and supporting special credit institutions 
catering to specialized credit needs, and through influence over the lending policies of 
such institutions, it can help to some degree to re-channel real resources in desired 
directions, both between the public and private sector and within the private sector itself.” 
(ibid., p. 198). 15 
 
 Writing about the same issue almost fifteen years later (in 1971), another 
prominent Federal Reserve official, Andrew F. Brimmer, a member of the Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors,  looks back on the experience with “developmental” central 
banking in the developing world. “…during the last ten years, a number of central banks 
concerned themselves with problems of economic development almost as much as they 
did with the traditional functions of central banking. (Brimmer, 1971, p. 780.) 
By 1971, monetary officials, as represented even by a pro-Keynesian economist like 
Brimmer, had become more skeptical of the developmental role of central banks in 
developing countries.   
 
 Brimmer and his associates describe a variety of techniques that central banks 
pursued in the 1960’s: these included: providing capital to development institutions, such 
as industrial and agricultural development banks; extending credit to development banks 
an purchasing their securities; buying a small part of the equity of development banks; 
establishing a “securities regulation fund” to create a market for the securities of various 
development finance institutions, by using the profits from the ordinary operations of the 
central bank (ibid., p. 785); using differential discount rates to allocate credit to capital 
development projects16; the establishment of portfolio ceilings on activities having a low 
priority; various types of reserve requirements, including differential reserve 
                                                 
15 Of course, Bloomfield cautions that; “Such measures would for the most part be justified, however, only 
to the extent that they do not conflict with the overriding requirement of financial stability or involve the 
central bank in details of a sort that might distract its attention and energies from the effective 
implementation of a policy aimed at stability” (ibid; p. 197) 
 
16 These have been used in many countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru and AVenezuela, Israel, India, Indonesia, Korea, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Republic of China, and Thailand. The central bank charges a preferential rate on discounts or 
advances against favored types of paper to induce commercial banks to increase their lending. (Brimmer, 
1971, p. 786). 
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requirements to influence the allocation of credit17; using import deposit requirements, 
(primarily intended to deal with balance of payments difficulties) to also influence the 
allocation of bank credit18. (Brimmer, 1971). 
 
 Brimmer on the whole is somewhat negative about the effectiveness of many of 
these techniques, with the evidence from Brimmer’s study providing mixed results about 
the effectiveness of these policies.  The possible trade-off between developmental central 
bank and the maintenance of financial and macroeconomic stability is also a continuing 
concern. 
 
 Yet, despite these concerns, one sees in retrospect that support by the central bank 
of the government’s policy for industrial development made a key contribution to the rise 
of many of the more successful developing countries in the late 20th century. Alice 
Amsden reports, the role of medium and long-term financing, often supported by central 
banking mechanisms as just described, were key to the “Rise of the Rest”. 19 (Amsden, 
2000). The countries of the rest, according to Amsden, acquired a manufacturing base in 
the years prior to World War II and then, after the war, industrialized rapidly, moving, 
eventually into mid-level and even high-technology production. (ibid, pp. 1 -2).  Among 
many other factors, Amsden stresses the important role of finance in the success of these 
countries, and especially the mobilization and allocation of medium term and long-term 
finance for industrialization.  
 
 The state’s main agent for financing investment was the development bank. 
Sometimes, the whole banking sector in these countries was mobilized to direct long-
term credit to targeted industries, thereby “acting as a surrogate development bank”. 
(ibid., p. 129). Lending terms of development banks were almost always concessionary 
(ibid., p. 132).  The public finance behind the rest’s development banking was often “off-
budget” and related to non-tax revenues. It derived from foreign sources, deposits in 
government-owned banks post office savings accounts, and pension funds. As we just 
saw, many central banks played a key role here as well. 
 
 More specifically, central banks played an important role in accommodating the 
development oriented policies of these governments. Most kept effective real interest 
rates were often low, even negative.20  They also used capital controls to insulate 
domestic markets from hot money flows that could lead to over-valued exchange rates 
and crises. Furthermore, central banks also played an important role in the “off-budget” 
                                                 
17 These have been used in : Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, the Dominican Republic, Israel 
and Peru among other countries. (Brimmer, 1971, p. 788). 
18 Imports of developmentally important goods are subject to lower deposit requirements and hence are 
favored. This has been used in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, the Philippines, Uruguay and Vietnam. (Brimmer, 1971 p. 789).  
19 Amsden’s “rest” consist of China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand in 
Asia; Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico in Latin America; and Turkey in the Middle East. (Amsden, 
2000, p. 1). Here we briefly discuss six of these countries: China, India, South Korea, Thailand, Brazil and 
Mexico. 
20 Of course, these policies in some cases eventually had negative consequences; this comes back to the 
issue of the delicate balance between the developmental and stabilization roles of central banks. 
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financing of a number of these countries using the techniques described by Bloomfield 
and Brimmer as described above. These experiences were not all unqualified successes, 
of course. Still, in many cases, as part of a government policy, they helped underwrite 
significant economic development in many countries.21 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 This paper has argued that virtually throughout their history, central banks have 
financed governments, used allocation methods and subsidies to engage in “sectoral 
policy” and have attempted to manage the foreign exchanges, often with capital and 
exchange controls of various kinds. The current “best practice recipe”, then, goes against 
the history and tradition of central banking in the countries now most strongly promoting 
it. (Note the obvious parallels with Ha-Joon Chang’s argument with respect to trade and 
other policies, 2002.)  
 
 The question, then, is NOT whether central banks have or should pursue 
developmental policy, but rather: what kind of developmental policy should they 
conduct? Here history also gives some guidance. Central banks have been most effective 
in helping to foster development, especially in “late developers”, where they have been 
part of the governmental apparatus of industrial policy.  
 
 Throughout this history, a continuing tension has existed between the 
developmental roles of central banks and the stabilizing roles. Yet there is little evidence 
that the optimal solution to this tension is to abandon the developmental role entirely. 
Worse yet is to do - as many central banks under IMF tutelage have done – follow the 
lead of England and the U.S. as described earlier, and focus its developmental role 
entirely on promoting the financial sector, especially the fashionable “stock market 
based” financial sectors. There is little evidence that the stock-market based financial 
sectors promoted these days in many developing countries leads to faster economic 
growth or more development (Zhu, Ash and Pollin, 2004). Worse yet, promoting the 
financial sector through internal and external financial liberalization can make developing 
countries highly vulnerable to financial panics and crises, as we saw with the Asian 
financial crisis. (eg. see, Epstein, 2005b). Thus, rather than resolving the tension between 
the developmental and stabilization central bank roles, this financial sector promotion 
approach associated with financial liberalization and neo-liberal central  banking poses 
the danger of making the tension even worse. 
 
                                                 
21 Severe space constraints prevent me from giving extensive documentation of these cases here. 
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